

Plácido Benavides: Texas Hero or Tejano Turncoat?

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This article is a reconsideration, correction, and cautionary tale for historians—young and old. In 2006, Dr. Frank de la Teja, professor and chairman of the Texas State University History Department, approached me to participate in a symposium on his campus. The conference, he explained, would examine the contributions of Tejano leaders before the formation of the Texas Republic. He invited me, and several other Texas historians interested in Tejano topics, to prepare lectures on individual leaders. Under Frank's editorship, the expanded essays eventually saw publication in the anthology, **Tejano Leadership in Mexican and Revolutionary Texas**. Frank asked me to take on Plácido Benavides.¹

That made sense. Benavides and I were both **Victorianos**, as I was then a professor at The Victoria College. Benavides was a soldier for most of his adult life and I was a military historian. It seemed a good fit. A suspicion confirmed when I began the research. I soon warmed to the topic—and the man.

So who was Plácido Benavides and why was he considered a Tejano leader? Like many of the state's heroes, he was not originally a Tejano. A native of Reynosa, Tamaulipas, Benavides was born in 1810. His godfather was Captain Enrique Villareal. The association proved vital. Villareal paid for the boy's education and in 1828 dispatched the young man to Texas. There, Benavides accepted the position as secretary to Fernando De León, commissioner of the De León colony and son of the *empresario* Martín De León.²

The twenty-two-year-old secretary did not arrive alone. Three married brothers—Ysidro, Nicolás, and Eugenio—traveled north with him. They claimed lands north of Victoria. Plácido's duties kept him in town, where his talents impressed the *empresario*. As secretary, Benavides oversaw correspondence, recorded business transactions, and mastered the inner workings of a borderland colony. No job could have better groomed him for a leadership role. Lettered and respectable, Benavides further assumed responsibilities as the colony's teacher.³

Benavides grew comfortable in Victoria and made plans to sink his roots there. He began construction of a house—and what a house it was. The structure was a *torreón*, a circular defensive bastion. It had gun slits on the first floor and a heavy reinforced door. Because of Comanche and Apache raids, such strongholds dotted the northern frontier. A distinctive Victoria landmark, locals labeled the building “Plácido's Round House.”⁴

There seemed to be no task Benavides could not master. In 1832, Victorianos elected him alcalde. He performed the duties of that position so well that he won reelection in 1834. Late in 1832, Benavides also won the hand of eighteen-year-old Agustina, the daughter of Don Martín and Patricia De León. Their union produced three daughters: Pilar, Librada, and Matiana. The young man was affable, diligent, and, most of all, ambitious. He likely would have prospered in any circumstances, but joining the colony's most prominent family certainly boosted his social standing. Entrenched in Victoria society, he assumed a high profile. After the death of his father-in-law in 1833, Mexican officials recognized his talents and authorized Benavides to assume the duties of colonial administrator.⁵

Of all of his accomplishments, perhaps the greatest was his almost instinctive talent for tactics. A native of the northern borderlands, he had never known a time when Indian raids did not threaten his people. Assisted by his brother-in-law, Silvestre De León, he commanded the Victoria militia in numerous forays against Coco and Tonkawa camps. On other occasions, however, Tonkawas proved useful allies. In 1834, Captain Benavides mustered a company of Tejano and Anglo settlers that clashed with Karankawas at Green Lake in what is now western Calhoun County. Local Tonkawas probably augmented the force. Although the Karankawas offered a dodged defense, Benavides's motley force routed them.⁶

In 1832 and 1833, the De León Colony became increasingly embroiled in the issues concerning their Anglo-American neighbors. José María Jesús Carvajal, a young surveyor who had married Don Martín's daughter María de Refugia, became a community lightning rod. Fluent in the English language, Carvajal progressively involved himself in the interests of the American colonists. He, like many Mexican federalists, supported American immigrants for the economic benefits they provided Texas. Moreover, Carvajal sincerely admired the Anglo settlers and they genuinely trusted him—so much so that in May 1831 he has won election to an Anglo-American caucus to petition the Mexican government for redress from the abuses of centralist commander Juan Davis Bradburn. The following November, Carvajal won appointment to the civil government at San Felipe de Austin. He also helped the American residents of Liberty establish their town council. As a bilingual surveyor, he traveled the region befriending both Tejanos and Anglos. Victoria was a federalist bastion, and the majority of its residents sided with American settlers on issues of common interest.⁷

Nonetheless, many citizens castigated Carvajal for being *too* friendly with the Americans. Such associations might bring centralist wrath down upon their heads. Yet, Plácido Benavides stood with his beleaguered brother-in-law. By bucking popular opinion, Benavides proved himself a firm defender of federalism, a loyal friend, and a man of unassailable character.

Late in 1834, Carvajal moved his family to San Antonio de Béxar. In February 1835, citizens elected him representative for the Béxar district to the state congress in Monclova. Meeting in March 1835, the Monclova congress ignored President Antonio López de Santa Anna's orders to disband state militia companies. It also authorized the sale of some 1.2 million Texas acres to speculators. The proceeds provided for the raising of a federalist army to resist centralist tyranny.

In June 1835, General Martín Perfecto de Cos arrived in Saltillo at the head of a centralist army. He carried arrest warrants for every member of the Monclova congress. Carvajal rode hell-for-leather to Béxar, where he halted his journey just long enough to collect Refugia and their children. Then, with his family in tow, he made his way to Victoria. Now that Cos had declared him a traitor, could he still rely on the support of his hometown friends and family?⁸

Whatever their political persuasion, few Victorianos were willing to surrender one of their own to a centralist firing squad—certainly not Plácido Benavides. Late in June, a company of centralist cavalry arrived in Victoria with orders to apprehend Carvajal. Yet, Benavides ambushed the centralists and booted them back to Béxar without their prisoner.⁹

In September 1835, news arrived in Victoria that shattered the community's tranquility. General Cos was marching toward Texas with orders from Santa Anna to quell rebellion and execute dissidents. Carvajal was certainly on the arrest list and, now that Benavides had defied centralist authority, he likely was too. The time to choose sides had finally arrived.¹⁰

Just up the road from Victoria, the American residents of Gonzales refused to surrender their cannon and, on October 2, 1835, issued a challenge to centralist soldiers to “Come and Take It.” The subsequent skirmish ignited the long anticipated conflict.¹¹

Now that the rebellion had begun in earnest, Benavides determined to strive manfully in the federalist cause. During the course of the conflict, he assembled a distinguished record:

- He commanded a company of Tejano rancheros in George M. Collingsworth's force, which captured the Presidio La Bahía on October 9–10, 1835.¹²
- He marched his men to San Antonio, where they fought against Cos in the siege of Béxar. Benavides received notice for his gallantry and efficiency.¹³
- Early in 1836, the alcalde of Matamoros warned Benavides of Santa Anna's plans to draw Texans to Matamoros in order to defeat them from the rear while Santa Anna simultaneously attacked Goliad and Béxar. Benavides rode to San Patricio and informed Robert C. Morris of the plot; Morris enclosed Benavides's warning in a letter to Colonel James Walker Fannin, who was then at Refugio planning to carry out the provisional government's campaign against Matamoros. Benavides's message caused Fannin instead to remove his headquarters to Goliad.¹⁴
- In February 1836, the General Council appointed Benavides a first lieutenant in the regular cavalry.¹⁵
- On March 2, 1836, rode with Dr. James Grant's unit. General José Urrea launched a surprise attack at Agua Dulce Creek. Before he fell, Grant dispatched Benavides to warn Fannin of Urrea's advance.¹⁶

Benavides galloped to Goliad and alerted the garrison of the enemy's approach, but what he learned there unsettled his world. On March 2—the same day that Benavides had been fighting for his life at Agua Dulce Creek—delegates at the Town of Washington had declared Texas independence from Mexico. That declaration changed everything. He was a Mexican fighting **against** centralist tyranny and **for** the federalist Constitution of 1824. As a federalist and a man

of principle, he would not help strip Texas from Mexico. He explained his quandary to Colonel Fannin, who amicably discharged him from the Texian army. Benavides returned to Victoria, where he proclaimed his neutrality and sought to sit out the rest of the war.

At least, that is what **most** historians say.

The consensus narrative depicts Tejanos as hapless victims buffeted by the winds of change. Tejanos, as the late David Weber asserted, “had to choose between siding with Anglo-American rebels, remaining loyal to Mexico, or trying to remain neutral—and neutrality was a nearly impossible option, as Plácido Benavides discovered.” Thus, Benavides became the poster boy for Tejano neutrality gone awry. Yet, is such an image accurate?¹⁷

Late in March, Benavides was inspecting his ranch when he came upon the wounded Isaac C. Hamilton, the quartermaster of the Alabama Red Rovers. On March 19, General Urrea had overtaken Fannin’s command on its march toward Victoria, and the battle of Coleto Creek ensued. Outnumbered and outgeneraled, Fannin surrendered the following day. Mexican soldiers escorted their prisoners back to the Presidio La Bahía. Then, on March 27, obedient to Santa Anna’s direct order, they gunned down 342 unarmed Texian prisoners. In the chaos, several of Fannin’s men escaped the massacre, among them Isaac Hamilton. Seriously wounded and starving, he stumbled onto Benavides’s ranch. He knew Hamilton, for they had served together at Goliad. Benavides placed Hamilton in a cart and pledged to take him to safety.¹⁸

Yet, when a centralist cavalry patrol approached, Benavides called out he had captured one of the rebels and surrendered Hamilton. Not only that, but he calmly demanded a receipt for his prisoner. Hamilton later recounted how he was “placed on a bare backed horse and most cruelly beaten through the prairie until we arrived at Victoria.” There he awaited a firing squad.¹⁹

Hamilton did not, however, meet his expected fate. He was one of those fortunate Texians saved by the intercession of Francita Alavez, the “Angel of Goliad.” Hamilton subsequently escaped and made his way back to Texian lines. He never forgave Benavides and frequently related the “treachery of the Mexican who betrayed him” to all who would listen. According to one of Hamilton’s descendants, “Family tales picture Isaac thereafter as embittered and under driving compulsion to find and kill Plácido.” He even went so far as to commission a new rifle, “which he told friends he was going to use in killing this Mexican, when he found him.”²⁰

That was but one incident that colored Texian attitudes. With news of Fannin’s defeat at Coleto Creek, many Victorianos who had earlier proclaimed their devotion to the federalist cause now sought to demonstrate their loyalty to Santa Anna’s centralist regime. Henry Reilly, in Victoria at the time, later described the harrowing escape of Doctor Benjamin Harrison, reputedly the son of President William Henry Harrison:

The inhabitants [of Victoria] became extremely insulting to the few Americans who remained, and as soon as they ascertained Fanning’s [*sic*] defeat, they, **headed by the second Alcalde**, bound Dr. Harrison’s hands behind him, in conjunction with two other Americans, and commenced butchering them; they began on the others first, and by the time they had finished their damned work, Dr. H had succeeded in separating his hands,

and immediately ran into the Guadalupe timber which is uncommonly thick and secreted himself.²¹

It is difficult to know how much stock to place in this primary document. It was a newspaper article and newspapers then were no more reliable than they are now. It is also hard to know what Reilly meant by the term “second Alcalde.” What we do know is that Plácido Benavides was serving as alcalde at that time.²²

No less an authority than General José Urrea verified that Victoria’s citizens were in league with the centralist forces: “The [Victoria] inhabitants—Mexican, French, and Irish—had been in communication with me, and when I arrived they had arrested six of the enemy who were in the town. Two hours after our arrival a party of twenty was seen down the river making their way toward Victoria. I issued orders to cut them off from the woods along the banks of the Guadalupe, and these having been carried out, they were all killed or taken prisoners.”²³

Few nowadays remember the **Victoria Massacre**, but Texians at the time would have learned the particulars and abhorred them. Although many Victorianos had fought alongside Texians in the early battles, most of them demonstrated little enthusiasm for Texas independence. When the political and military tides turned against them, many were quick to proclaim their neutrality or even join the centralists.

Following the Texian victory at San Jacinto, Brigadier General Thomas J. Rusk established his headquarters at Victoria. With rumors rife of another Mexican offensive, he sought to place the country in a state of readiness. Victorianos made his job harder. On June 8, 1836, he learned that some were “driving in toward the Nueces [River] from five hundred to one thousand head of cattle. It is very important that they should be prevented from passing the Nueces.” Important, indeed, since Rusk needed those beeves to feed his army. Wishing to keep their cattle out of Texian bellies, Tejano ranchers drove them toward Mexican-controlled territory. Their actions made Rusk aware that most Victorianos did not support the Republic of Texas or the army that sought to preserve it.²⁴

Rusk understood that the advantages that Texians had achieved in eighteen minutes at San Jacinto could be lost just as quickly. As he expressed it, “We have but a short period to organize upon this frontier a sufficient force to meet the enemy in another Campaign where beyond doubt he will come with redoubled numbers.” Later that month Rusk admitted that he had taken some “pretty high handed steps,” which he believed justified “by the circumstances.”²⁵

One of Rusk’s highhanded steps had a profound effect on Benavides and his extended family. In June 1836, Rusk ordered the detention and evacuation of all local Tejanos suspected of sympathy with Mexico. Many prominent Victorianos, among the De León and Benavides families, found themselves exiled to New Orleans.

On June 27, General Rusk issued a proclamation that announced that neutrality would no longer remain an option for Victorianos: “He that claims a home and a habitation in Texas—must now *fight for it, or abandon it*, to some one who will.” This policy boded ill for Benavides and other Tejano federalists. Clearly, the new order was establishing hegemony.²⁶

It is currently fashionable to denounce Rusk as a racist thug who engineered a Tejano “Trail of Tears.” Yet, such an assessment is shrill and more than a little disingenuous. Rusk was not an evil man, merely a commander with a distasteful duty to perform. He earnestly believed that the Mexicans were about to launch another offensive. On the frontier at Victoria, Rusk and his paltry 350-man force acted as their country’s first line of defense. He well understood that Victorianos had never supported Texas independence and could not allow the town’s clandestine agents to further an invading enemy’s military and political objectives. The recent conduct of local Tejanos had wholly justified his concerns. Just months earlier, Victorianos had supplied vital intelligence to General Urrea. Moreover, local Tejanos had approved of, and even participated in, the murder of helpless prisoners of war. There was but one way to assure security: evacuate all suspicious civilians. Rusk knew his actions were ruthless, but he believed that conditions supported them. He would have believed it even more if he had known of the March 23 letter written by General Urrea to Santa Anna. Part of Yale University’s Streeter Collection, this remarkable document sheds new light on Benavides’s conduct and the activities that took place in and around Victoria. No other historian has translated this document into English and I am pleased to share it here for the first time.

Guadalupe Victoria March 23 of 1836

Sir General D. Francisco Vital Fernandez – Colleague and Friend – I am so tired that I don’t have time to include more than copies of the parts given to our General in Chief regarding my last operations.

I have in my power more than 600 prisoners that I shall make rebuild the burned houses of Goliad—I go to rest a moment. I embrace you and remain your affectionate companion - *Jose Urrea*

Division of Operations – Most Excellent Sir – yesterday I marched from this point, as I told Your Excellency on 21 of the present: I directed myself to the House of Lim [John Linn], which finds itself situated over the Lake of Baca and the Guadalupe River. Two objectives took me: one was to look for the provisions I knew I could find there, and the other to cut off a group of 100 Americans that on the 21 escaped from me by way of the forest along said river. At two in the afternoon I arrived at the place of the meeting on the Arroy del Zorrillo: I captured four Americans whom I obliged to tell me the whereabouts of their buddies: I got them to tell me the place in which they were, which is a [illegible] forest: I had it besieged and then searched in its center for the enemy: I found him [the enemy] and suggested he surrender at discretion. Five minutes of conversation were enough to obtain my goal, and Colonel Ward, which is what he was titled, ten officials, and ninety men more gave me their weapons and remain at the disposition of Your Excellency and the Supreme Government, surrendered with discretion. In the door of the House of Lim, there are about 20 barrels of flour that tomorrow will be here. I am told that in la Boca [La Vaca?] there are other provisions and some tobacco, I will also make sure we get all of this— All of the families of the Americans that were around these parts have fled for Matagorda, some by land others by

boat, in two boats well armed that they assure me protect the emigration—They tell me too that the enemies try to fortify themselves again over the Colorado River: I will go reunite at this point my division, after garrisoning Goliad and El Copano, at the moment I will march against the enemy putting myself in accord with Sir General D. Joaquin Ramirez y Sesma, if Your Excellency does not order me something else.— I have equally the satisfaction to state to Y. E.[Your Excellency] that the disembarked enemies on El Copano, with the weapons and provisions that they brought, have given themselves up with discretion to the troop that accomplished the same, the Sr. Coronel titled D. Rafael de la Vara, chief that I left in charge of the supplies and baggage in the Mission of Refugio. As soon as I am sent the account of the capture, I will pass it to the hands of Y. E. recommending to you for now the activity and good sense with which Mr. la Vara worked. —**An advantage was also gained when the leader D[on] Palacio Benavides, Mexican, presented himself to me putting himself at the disposition of the Supreme Government; he has already offered some services, offering to employ himself as soon as he is useful.**—In the same manner, a sergeant, a bugler, and ten soldiers from Tampico presented themselves to me, from the force that Mejia brought from that point, when he had the audacity to attack it, with which troop I ordered to join the Jimenez Battalion. —I shall send the prisoners to Goliad so that they may join the rest that are there. — All I place in the superior knowledge of Your Excellency so that you resolve what is to your liking, with the purpose of restoring to you my respectful esteem.

God and Freedom. Guadalupe Victoria, March 23 of 1836. — **Jose Urrea**
— The Most Excellent Mr. President and General in Chief of the Army of Operations D.
Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.
Copy — Urrea.

PRINTED FROM EL MERCURIO OF MATAMOROS²⁷

What a remarkable document this is. It is positive proof that Benavides, far from seeking neutrality, joined the centralist cause. A time line might be useful. March 23, the date on which Urrea wrote the letter, was after Fannin’s surrender at Coleto Creek on March 20 but before the Goliad Massacre on March 27. Consequently, the cryptic “service” to which Urrea referred could not have been the betrayal of Isaac Hamilton; he remained in captivity inside the Presidio La Bahía. Given the time line, Benavides’s service may have been his willing participation in the Victoria massacre. Historians have dismissed Hamilton’s account as the ravings of an embittered racist. Yet, given the revelations of Urrea’s letter, it takes on considerably more credibility. Perhaps, historians owe Hamilton’s memory an apology. Texas historians have generally given Benavides the benefit of the doubt. The entry in the *Handbook of Texas* is typical. “After the battle of San Jacinto,” it reports, “Benavides was ostracized with most other Mexican Texans for his **supposed** sympathy with Mexico and forced to flee with the De León family to New Orleans” [emphasis added].

Suppose no longer; hard evidence now proves that Benavides **did** sympathize with Mexico. More than that, he actively fought against his former comrades.

But that in no way makes the man a villain. He was a patriotic Mexican.

Benavides never returned to Victoria. He contracted fever and died in 1837. His remains lie in Opelousas, Louisiana. Nor did Agustina return; she followed her husband to the grave five years later. Yet, Plácido's brother did come back as did Doña Patricia De León, who had taken in Agustina's three orphaned daughters. To this day De León and Benavides descendants continue to inhabit the area.²⁸

“Turncoat” is an ugly word, but in a world where words evoke specific meaning, Benavides's conduct certainly meets the definition. Does that mean he deserves a place in the Hall of Shame between Benedict Arnold and Vidkun Quisling?

No, it does not.

Historians must appraise their subjects within the context of their time, place, and culture. Don Plácido was a *patron*; it is perhaps significant that the English language has no equivalent. He may have been a man of principle but his first responsibility was to his people: the Victorianos. One should not demonize Plácido Benavides; he did his duty as he saw it. Nevertheless, one might say the same of Thomas J. Rusk.

It is a miserable and irreducible fact of war: good men do their duty and the innocent suffer the consequences.

Notes

¹ Jesús F. de la Teja, ed., *Tejano Leadership in Mexican and Revolutionary Texas* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010).

² *Handbook of Texas Online*, s.v. “Benavides, Plácido.”

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Willard B. Robinson, “Colonial Ranch Architecture in the Spanish-Mexican Tradition,” *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 83 (October 1979): 140. Benavides constructed his Round House on the Calle de los Diez Amigos (modern Main Street). The house was located at 302 Main, where Fossati's Delicatessen currently sits.

⁵ Roy Grimes, ed., *300 Years in Victoria County* (Victoria: Victoria Advocate Publishing Company, 1968; reprint, Austin: Nortex Press, 1985), 70.

⁶ Hobart Huson, *Refugio: A Comprehensive History of Refugio County from Aboriginal Times to 1953* (Woodsboro, Texas: Rooke Foundation, 1953-1955, I: 41.

⁷ Joseph E. Chance, *José María de Jesús Carvajal: The Life and Times of a Mexican Revolutionary* (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 2006), 2-23; see also *Handbook of Texas Online*, s.v. “José María Jesús Carbajal.”

⁸ Chance, *José María de Jesús Carvajal*, 32-33.

⁹ Ana Carolina Castillo Crimm, *De León: A Tejano Family History* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 142.

¹⁰ Gregg Cantrell, *Stephen F. Austin: Empresario of Texas* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 297-328.

¹¹ Stephen L. Hardin, *Texian Iliad: A Military History of the Texas Revolution* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 11-13.

¹² *Ibid.*, 14-17.

¹³ Huson, *Refugio*, 1:291.

¹⁴ Robert C. Morris to James W. Fannin, 6 February 1836, in John H. Jenkins, ed., *Papers of the Texas Revolution* (Austin: Presidal Press, 1973), 4: 274-276; *Handbook of Texas*, s.v. “Robert C. Morris”; Stephen L. Hardin, *The Alamo 1836: Santa Anna’s Texas Campaign* (Oxford: Osprey, 2001), 7-8, 52-56.

¹⁵ *Handbook of Texas Online*, s.v. “Benavides, Plácido.”

¹⁶ Ruben R. Brown, “Expedition under Johnson and Grant,” in James M. Day, comp., *The Texas Almanac, 1857-1873: A Compendium of Texas History* (Waco: Texian Press, 1967), 218-224.

¹⁷ The Weber quotation appears in his “Foreword” to Teja’s *Tejano Leadership in Mexican and Revolutionary Texas*, ix. In fairness, he wrote that after reading my chapter in that book where I argued that point. Then, at the time of publication I had no knowledge of the Urrea’s March 23 letter.

¹⁸ Stephen L. Hardin, “Efficient in the Cause,” in *Tejano Journey, 1770-1850*, ed. Gerald E. Poyo (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 65-66.

¹⁹ Isaac D. Hamilton vertical file, Dolph Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin; Lester Hamilton, *Goliad Survivor: Isaac D. Hamilton* (San Antonio, Naylor, 1971).

²⁰ *Handbook of Texas Online*, s.v. “Alavez, Francita”; Isaac D. Hamilton vertical file, DBCAH.

²¹ *Morning Courier and New York Enquirer*, 28 July 1836. I am grateful to Gary Zaboly for bringing this source to my attention.

²² Grimes, *300 Years in Victoria County*, 448.

²³ José Urrea, *Diario de las operaciones militares de la división que al mando General José Urrea hizo en Campaña de Tejas* (Victoria de Durango: n.p., 1838), 25-26; for an English translation, see Carlos E. Castaneda, ed., *The Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution* (Dallas: P. L. Turner, [1928]; reprint edition, Austin: Graphic Ideas, 1970), 238.

²⁴ Thomas Jefferson Rusk to James Smith, 8 June 1836, in Jenkins, ed., *Papers*. 7: 73-74.

²⁵ Rusk to David G. Burnet, 13 June 1836, in *ibid.*, 7:135-140.

²⁶ Rusk, [Proclamation to the People of Texas]. Guadalupe-Victoria, 27 June 1836, broadside, cited in Joseph Milton Nance, *After San Jacinto: The Texas-Mexican Frontier, 1836-1841* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1963), 12.

²⁷ José de Urrea to Antonio López Santa Anna, 23 March 1836 in Streeter Collection, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. I am indebted to Dr. Gregg Dimmick for bringing this groundbreaking source to my attention. I am also indebted to my McMurry University colleague Dr. Brenna Troncoso for her assistance in translating this document.

²⁸ Huson, *Refugio*, I: 398; Ana Carolina Castillo Crimm, “Finding Their Way,” in Poyo, *Tejano Journey*, 121; see also her *De León*, 183-190.